Russia’s Shadow Fleet: How Tankers Evade Sanctions and Fuel Conflict

Russia’s Shadow Fleet is a group of approximately 400–600 Russian oil tankers that frequently change their names and sail under flags of third countries such as Panama, Gabon, the Cook Islands, or Eswatini.

These ships have complex and opaque ownership structures, often registered in countries that have not imposed sanctions on Russia (for example, the United Arab Emirates, the Marshall Islands, India, China), which significantly complicates their tracking and identification.

How sanctions evasion works:

Tankers change flags and names to avoid sanctions and the $60 per barrel oil price cap.

Oil is often transferred directly at sea between ships, which complicates tracking the cargo’s origin and allows repeated changes of ownership.

The ships are insured by dubious insurers outside the Western network, often in countries like India, China, or the UAE, violating International Maritime Organization (IMO) rules.

Many tankers are old (on average around 18 years), increasing the risk of accidents and environmental disasters.

Why Russia gets away with it:

Western sanctions target direct Russian entities, but complex ownership and registration in neutral countries allow the fleet to operate.

Some countries and ports (China, India, Turkey, Russia) are open to these ships, facilitating their operations.

Western shipowners sold old tankers for billions, indirectly aiding the fleet.

Known ships:

About 270 ships have been sanctioned, with roughly two-thirds currently inactive, but the fleet can quickly replace lost tankers.

Examples include the tanker Gogland, sailing under the Palau flag, identified in the Baltic Sea. Other ships are often registered under Panama, Gabon, Cook Islands, or Eswatini flags.

Detection is done by European and international institutions, investigative teams, and satellite tracking, with the EU and NATO countries gradually imposing sanctions and planning seizures.

Russia’s shadow fleet plays a key role in evading sanctions on Russian oil and financing war activities, while also posing environmental and security risks to Europe and the world.

How fictitious ship registration works (example Panama):

Owners exploit legal and administrative loopholes of so-called “flags of convenience.”

They establish companies or use intermediaries who, for a fee, register the ship under the Panamanian flag without the owner’s physical presence.

Minimal information about the ship and owner is provided, often false or incomplete.

Agents in Panama handle the paperwork and register the ship quickly, sometimes within days, without thorough checks of the true owner or voyage purpose.

After registration, the ship can be easily renamed, reflagged, or have ownership changed, making tracking and oversight difficult.

This system enables sanctions evasion, hides true ship owners, and complicates international maritime control. Panama is one of the most used countries for such practices due to low fees, flexible rules, and weak enforcement.